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The Rise of Offshoring: 
It’s Not Wine for Cloth Anymore
Introduction 
In 1817, when David Ricardo penned his celebrated treatise on The
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, communication
between England and Portugal was no faster and only slightly less
costly than shipping wine or cloth from one country to the other.
Most goods were produced in a single location, as fragmentation of
the production process was uneconomic in a world in which the coor-
dination of production activities in remote locations was difficult if
not impossible. No wonder Ricardo illustrated his principle of
comparative advantage with an example involving the exchange of
one good for another. 
Almost two centuries later, the core of international trade theory
continues to be dominated by thinking about production and exchange
of complete goods. Our understanding of the effects of international
integration on prices, production patterns, and factor income comes
primarily from analyzing models in which goods—sometimes used as
intermediate inputs, but often serving final consumer demand—are
produced entirely in one location. But times are a-changin’. Revolu-
tionary progress in communication and information technologies has
enabled an historic (and ongoing) breakup of the production process.
Countries like England and Portugal still produce some goods from
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start to finish, but increasingly they participate in global supply chains
in which the many tasks required to manufacture complex industrial
goods (or, increasingly, to provide knowledge-intensive services) are
performed in several, disparate locations. To better understand the
implications of these trends, we need a new paradigm for studying
international trade that emphasizes not only the exchange of
complete goods, but also trade in specific tasks, or what we shall refer
to as “offshoring.”
1
The popular press is replete with stories of task trade. Tempest
(1996), for example, describes the global process for producing a
Barbie doll. The doll is designed in Mattel’s headquarters in El
Segundo, Calif. Oil is refined into ethylene in Taiwan and formed into
plastic pellets that are used to produce the doll’s body. Barbie’s nylon
hair is manufactured in Japan, while the cotton cloth for her clothing
originates in China. The molds for the doll are made in the United
States, as are the paint pigments used to decorate it and the cardboard
used for packaging. Assembly takes place in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Finally, the dolls are quality tested in California, and marketed from
there and elsewhere around the globe. Burrows (1995) tells a similar
story about Texas Instruments’ high-speed telecommunications chip,
which was conceived by engineers in Sweden; designed in Nice,
France, with software tools developed in Houston; produced in Japan
and Dallas; and tested in Taiwan. An annual report of the World Trade
Organization (WTO, 1998) describes the production of a particular
“American” car: 
Thirty percent of the car’s value goes to Korea for assembly,
17.5 percent to Japan for components and advanced technol-
ogy, 7.5 percent to Germany for design, 4 percent to Taiwan
and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5 percent to the United
Kingdom for advertising and marketing services, and 1.5
percent to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. This
means that only 37 percent of the production value...is gener-
ated in the United States (p. 36).
More recently, attention has shifted to the offshoring of a variety of
services. Almost daily we read media stories of companies in India
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(Pollak, 2003), develop software (Thurm, 2004), prepare tax forms
(Robertson and others, 2005), and even perform heart surgery on
American patients (Baker and others, 2006). Blinder (2006) refers to
the expanding feasibility of offshoring formerly nontradable services
as the “Third Industrial Revolution.” 
Much ink has been spilt on the subject of offshoring.
2 But, so far, we
lack a simple analytic framework for investigating how improvements in
communication and information technologies that give rise to increased
offshoring affect labor markets, production patterns, prices, and welfare
in the participating countries. In this paper, we will describe such a
framework that we have developed more formally in Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006). Our simple model of offshoring allows us to
decompose the impact on wages of any improvements in the technology
for offshoring into three components: a labor-supply effect that is famil-
iar from the broadcasts and writings of Lou Dobbs and others; a
relative-price effect that captures the labor-market implications of any
movements in relative prices affected by the improved possibilities for
offshoring; and a productivity effect that seems to have been largely over-
looked in earlier discussions. We show that the productivity effect can
dominate the others in a familiar trade environment, so that improved
possibilities for offshoring low-skill jobs actually will raise the wages of
domestic workers who perform these types of tasks. By the same token,
improved possibilities for offshoring some high-skill tasks may boost the
wage of domestic white-collar workers. Not only might the offshoring
of certain tasks generate gains from trade, as famously noted by Council
of Economic Advisers Chairman Gregory Mankiw and discussed in the
2004 Economic Report of the President and elsewhere (see, for example,
Blinder, 2006, and Leamer, 2006), but improvements in communica-
tions technologies that make offshoring easier and cheaper also might
boost the wages of domestic workers with skill levels similar to those
used in performing the tasks that migrate offshore. 
Our conclusion can best be understood by drawing an analogy
between improved prospects for offshoring tasks and factor-augment-
ing technological progress. When some of the tasks performed by a
certain type of labor can more readily be performed abroad, the firms
that gain the most are the ones that use this type of labor intensively
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in their production processes. The augmented profitability of these
firms gives them an incentive to expand relative to firms that rely
most heavily on other types of labor, which, in turn, enhances their
labor demand. Some of this increased labor demand falls on local
workers, who perform tasks that cannot easily be moved offshore.
This is quite similar to the process generated by technological
progress that improves the productivity of a certain type of worker.
Although fewer of these workers are needed to produce a given
amount of output, the adjustment in output levels in response to the
new technology can lead to a net increase in demand for the type of
labor whose productivity has increased. 
In the last part of the paper, we perform a “back-of-the-envelope”
calculation intended to give a sense of the relative magnitudes of the
productivity effect and the labor-supply effect of improved opportuni-
ties for offshoring. We examine the evolution of blue-collar wages in
the United States from 1997 to 2004. The real wages of the least skilled
among the blue-collar workers have risen by about 3.7 percent during
this period. (The real wage of the average blue-collar worker has risen
by 6.3 percent during these seven years.) Total factor productivity
(TFP) has been rising in the United Sates during this period at an
average annual rate of 1.6 percent, which alone should have pushed up
wages for all workers by 11.8 percent between 1997 and 2004, includ-
ing the least skilled among them. On the other hand, the relative price
of U.S. imports of manufactured goods from nonindustrialized coun-
tries have dropped precipitously. By itself, this should have depressed
blue-collar wages via the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) mechanism (a fall
in the relative price of textiles, apparel, and other such labor-intensive
goods exerts downward pressure on the wage of less-educated domestic
labor). We show that what is left after accounting for the estimated
effects of TFP growth and terms-of-trade movements is a positive
residual. This residual reflects the combined productivity effect and
labor-supply effect of improvements in offshoring possibilities, along
with, of course, any other considerations omitted from our model.
Our observation that the residual is positive amounts to a claim that
low-skill wages have not fallen as much as one should have expected
given the combined forces of terms-of-trade movement and TFP
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improvement. A possible interpretation is that the productivity gains
associated with U.S. firms’ moving some tasks offshore have served
to bolster U.S. wages, which is consistent with our theory, but
contrary to the fears of Lou Dobbs and others. 
In this paper, we focus on the international organization of production
processes and the effect that this may have on U.S. wages. There are, of
course, many other trends in the world apart from the reductions in the
cost of trading tasks that we emphasize here. Chief among them are
reforms in many developing countries that have converted them into
market economies with fast economic and technological growth. The
goods and services that these countries produce and consume have a
potentially important impact on international prices and on the pattern
of production and factor prices in developed economies like the United
States. Analyzing the technological catch-up of some of these large
emerging economies and its effects on other industrialized countries is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
Offshoring 
Adam Smith (1776) famously described the division of labor in a
pin factory in late 18th-century England: 
One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts
it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the
head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations;
to put it on is a peculiar business; to whiten the pins is another;
it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the
important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided
into about 18 distinct operations, which, in some manufactories,
are all performed by distinct hands, though in some others the
same man will sometimes perform two or three of them (p. 4). 
At the time, the key to high productivity in industrial production was
to concentrate the various tasks needed for producing a good under a
single roof. By specializing in one or a small number of tasks, each
worker could focus his energy, and thereby perform most efficiently. But
without proximity, it would have been impossible to coordinate the
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efforts of the various workers or to combine their inputs into a single
product. Communication required physical travel. Transportation of
intermediate inputs or partially processed goods was slow and costly.
The economic geography of the time pointed to agglomeration in
production, not fragmentation. Specialization implied geographic
concentration. So, factories produced goods, which were shipped to
final consumers. If the consumers happened to reside in a different
country, there was international trade. 
This description of manufacturing and trade remained apt for nearly
two centuries. But, recently, a revolution in transportation and (espe-
cially) communication technologies has weakened the link between
specialization and geographic concentration. Now, it is increasingly possi-
ble to separate tasks in time and space. Instructions can be delivered
instantaneously. Detailed information about product specifications and
the tasks that need to be performed can be conveyed electronically. And
partially processed goods can be transported more quickly and at a lower
cost than ever before. Indeed, for services like radiology, copy editing, and
tax preparation, the work product can be sent electronically, with no loss
of time and virtually no cost. Increasingly, international trade involves not
only complete goods, but also individual tasks, or relatively small
numbers of them. In the new global production processes, specialization
can be achieved without geographic concentration. This has allowed
firms to take advantage of differences in factor costs and expertise across
countries, thereby enhancing the benefits of specialization. 
Thomas Friedman (2005) has described these trends in picturesque
terms. He lists 10 forces that have “flattened” the world. Among them are
the birth of the Internet; the development of work-flow software;
outsourcing; offshoring; “supply-chaining”; “in-forming” (Internet search-
ing); and advances in digital, mobile, personal, and virtual
communication technologies. Clearly, these are forces that facilitate (or
reflect) the increasing tradability of tasks. 
Yet the world remains far from flat, as Leamer (2006) has empha-
sized. Proximity matters. In fact, as Hillberry and Hummels (2005)
have shown, it still must matter a great deal for many tasks because
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most exchange takes place between partners who are located very close
to one another. While some tasks can be undertaken remotely with
little difficulty, others must be done in face-to-face contact or else the
production process suffers greatly. Leamer and Storper (2001), for
example, distinguish between tasks that require codifiable information
and those that require tacit information. The former, they argue, is easy
to transfer because it can be expressed in a symbol system, be it linguis-
tic, mathematical, or visual. But the latter cannot be conveyed in
symbols, requiring instead that the parties “know” each other or have a
broad common background. Complex, noncodifiable messages are best
communicated in face-to-face interchange, where visual contact
provides a basis for building and maintaining relationships. 
Levy and Murnane (2004) point to the similarities between tasks
that can be performed remotely and those that can be performed by
a computer. In order for a computer to perform a task, it must be
possible to describe it using rules-based logic. But when this is possi-
ble, it also will be possible to have the task done remotely with
relatively little risk of miscommunication and a modest cost of moni-
toring. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) divide tasks into five broad
categories according to whether they require expert thinking,
complex communication, routine cognitive processes, routine
manual labor, or nonroutine manual labor. The routine tasks—be
they cognitive or manual—are susceptible to computerization and
offshoring because they can be well-described in deductive rules. The
others are more difficult to computerize or offshore because they
require pattern recognition and inductive reasoning.
3
Finally, Blinder (2006) focusing on the service sectors, distinguishes
between those tasks that must be delivered personally and those that can
be delivered electronically. Most personal services cannot be performed
remotely, while impersonal services are susceptible to offshoring. But, as
Blinder notes, improvements in information technology will change the
calculus, rendering more and more personal services into impersonal
ones. Like Levy and Murnane (2004), he emphasizes that the tradabil-
ity of a task does not correspond perfectly (or even very well) with the
skill required to perform it. 
 66 Gene M. Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
Evidence of increased task trade 
Media interest in offshoring (or what the press often misleadingly
refers to as “outsourcing”) exploded during the period before the U.S.
presidential election of 2004, as Mankiw and Swagel (2006) have
documented, and any resident at the time will surely recall. Yet hard
evidence on the extent of task trade is difficult to come by, for several
reasons. First, task trade may occur either between affiliates of a multi-
national firm or as arms-length transactions between unaffiliated
firms. The reporting requirements for these alternative forms of trade
differ. And when the transaction occurs within a firm, the applicable
trade and profit taxes may give the parent company incentive to
manipulate the transfer prices, and thereby distort the measured trade
flows. Second, task trade may or may not involve the movement of
physical goods across international boundaries. If the tasks performed
offshore involve the production of intermediate goods or components,
or the assembly of components into finished products, then goods will
be transported across borders and the transactions will be captured in
customs data. But task trade increasingly involves the performance of
business functions that do not result in any good passing through a
customs house and, thus, often do not generate a paper trail. Exam-
ples of such business functions include software programming and
design, call center operations, marketing research, word processing,
data entry, accounting, payroll operations, and the like. Such activities
are considered to be service trade, which must be measured by statis-
tical agencies using survey instruments. In the United States, the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has been asking firms about their
service trade with affiliated parties only since 1997. 
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, the concept of trading tasks
inherently concerns the disintegration of the production process and
the adding of value at disparate locations. Yet, unlike the recording of
domestic transactions as value added in the national income accounts,
trade data are collected and reported as gross flows. The measurement
of trade as gross values of imports and exports was perhaps appropri-
ate at a time when trade flows comprised mostly finished goods. But
such measures are inadequate to the task of measuring the extent of a
country’s international integration in a world with global supply
chains and internationally dispersed production processes.
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To measure task trade that generates shipments of goods, we would
like to know the sources of the value added embodied in the goods
and the uses to which the goods are eventually put. But the statistical
agencies have no way to know the national content of goods that are
traded, nor do they track the uses of these goods; that is, whether they
are destined for further processing or for sale to final consumers. The
BEA does inquire about the sectoral source of the intermediate inputs
used by each industry to produce its output, but in so doing, it does
not distinguish between intermediate inputs purchased from local
sources and those purchased from abroad. 
The input-output data collected by the BEA can, however, be
combined with disaggregated trade data to give a sense of the growing
importance of trade in tasks. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) reports an estimate of imported
intermediate inputs for member countries by assuming that in every
industry in which inputs are demanded, the ratio of imported inputs
to domestically produced inputs of a particular good mirrors the ratio
of total imports to total domestic output of that good.
5 With this
assumption, imported intermediate inputs can be computed as the
weighted sum of all intermediate inputs used in domestic production,
using the import shares in total production plus imports for each
product category as the weights. Using the OECD data, we have
calculated the estimated share of imported inputs in total inputs used
by all goods-producing sectors in the United States and the estimated
share of imported inputs in the gross output of those sectors. The
graphs in Chart 1 show both measures to be growing steadily over a
period of almost three decades, with an apparent acceleration in the
most recent period for which data are available.
6
Another indication of the prevalence of task trade and its growing
importance in certain trade relationships can be found in the BEA
data on trade between related parties. Related party trade is defined
as trade between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries plus
trade between U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies and their parent
companies abroad. Much of this trade stems from the international
division of labor in global production processes. In 2005, related
party trade accounted for 47 percent of U.S. imports. Although this
 fraction has risen only modestly since 1992, when it was already 45
percent, Chart 2 shows that the aggregate experience masks variation
across trading partners. The chart shows that related party imports
already accounted for more than 60 percent of total U.S. imports
from Mexico in 1992, thanks in large part to the maquiladora
program that provided favorable tariff treatment to partially
processed goods that were exported to Mexico from the United States
and then reimported after receiving some additional value. But the
chart shows that the relative importance of intrafirm trade has been
growing rapidly in the U.S. trade relationships with Korea, China,
and Taiwan. Imports from related parties accounted for 27 percent of
total U.S. imports from Korea in 1992 and 11 percent of total U.S.
imports from China. By 2005, these figures had risen to 58 percent
and 26 percent, respectively. 
Improvements in information technology have facilitated the offshoring
of business services, as we have noted before. Official data on service trade
can provide some insight into the extent of such task trade, although the
available data do not show whether the imported services are used by firms
or by final consumers. Nor do the input-output accounts help much in
determining the industry-composition of demand for the various cate-
gories of services.
7 We follow the Government Accountability Office
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(2004) and others in focusing attention on the category “Business,
Professional and Technical” (BPT) services, which includes many of the
activities associated with task trade, such as accounting and bookkeeping
services, information and data processing, legal services, computer
programming, and management and consulting services. Chart 3 shows
total U.S. imports of BPT services for the years from 1997 through 2004,
expressed in 1997 dollars, and broken down by trade with affiliated and
unaffiliated partners. Imports of BPT services have grown in real terms
by more than 66 percent in these seven years. Still, BPT services
amounted to only about 16 percent of total imports of private services in
2005, which, in turn, accounted for about 13 percent of total U.S.
imports of goods and services in that year. Apparently, trade in service
tasks lags trade in manufacturing tasks, suggesting that there may be
room for substantial additional growth in this type of international divi-
sion of labor. 
So far, we have sought hints of task trade in the data on commodity
and service trade flows. We also can look to the labor market for
corroborating evidence. If task trade has been on the rise because of
ongoing improvements in firms’ ability to separate functions in time
and space, we should see American workers performing fewer of the
tasks that can easily be performed at a distance and more of those for
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which proximity is more valuable. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)
have paired data on job task requirements from the Dictionary of Occu-
pational Titles with samples of employed workers from the Census and
the Current Population Survey to construct time series of task inputs in
the U.S. economy from 1960 through 2002.
8 They have divided labor
inputs in the U.S. economy into five types of tasks, but for our
purposes it is more enlightening to aggregate their task categories into
two: tasks that are “routine” and tasks that are “nonroutine.” Routine
tasks include their “routine manual” and “routine cognitive” categories;
these tasks require methodical repetition of procedures that can be well-
described by a set of rules. Routine cognitive tasks may require
considerable skill and training, whereas routine manual tasks may
require less skill. Nonroutine tasks—which incorporates Autor, Levy,
and Murnane’s categories of “nonroutine analytic,” “nonroutine inter-
active,” and “nonroutine manual”—are tasks that require visual and
motor processing that cannot easily be described by rules. This category
also cuts across skill levels. We would expect it to be easier for a firm to
offshore routine tasks than nonroutine tasks, independent of the skill
level of the job. 
Chart 4 shows the input of routine and nonroutine tasks in the U.S.
economy from 1960 through 2002, relative to the 1960 distribution of
tasks. By construction, the trends in task input in this chart have been
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generated by changes in the composition of occupations in the labor
force and not by changes in the tasks required for a particular occupa-
tion.
9 The measure of routine tasks has been falling since 1970, while
that of nonroutine tasks has been rising, with acceleration in each case
in the most recent years. What this means is that relatively more U.S.
workers are doing jobs that cannot be well-described by mechanical
rules. The chart is consistent with the hypothesis that the United States
has been importing more of the tasks (at all skill levels) that can more
readily be moved offshore and increasing its specialization in those tasks
that cannot be performed remotely. Of course, there are other possible
explanations for the trends revealed in the chart; indeed, Autor, Levy,
and Murnane (2003) constructed their measures of task inputs to
examine the possible consequences of computerization.
Toward a new paradigm: Modeling trade in tasks 
Trade theory has long focused on trade in goods. Countries (or
firms) are posited to have access to “technologies” that describe how
factors of production can be combined to produce these goods. The
technologies are taken as given at a point in time, but they may evolve
over time. They may be assumed to be identical across countries,
although the empirical evidence suggests that they are not (see, for
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example, Trefler, 1995, or Davis and Weinstein, 2001). The theory
emphasizes the consequences of the relatively limited mobility of
factors; often it is assumed that factors cannot move across borders,
but goods (or at least some set of goods) can be traded costlessly, or
at some modest cost. 
To capture the recent trends, we wish to extend this traditional
framework to allow for trade in tasks, as well as trade in goods. To do
so, first, we need to represent the production process in terms of sets
of tasks rather than simply the combination of bundles of inputs.
Then, in keeping with the discussion in the “Offshoring” section, we
need to incorporate the idea that tasks can be performed remotely,
but some more easily than others. Finally, the revolution in commu-
nications technology can be analyzed as a reduction in the cost of
offshoring tasks. 
The model that we develop in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) begins with the specification of technologies for producing two
tradable goods. As in the traditional theory, the home country exports
one of these goods and may produce the other in competition with
imports. But, in contrast with standard theory, we elaborate the
production process by assuming that it involves sets of tasks. Some
tasks can be performed by labor with relatively little education or
training, while others must be performed by workers who possess
more skills. There may still be other tasks that are performed by other
factors of production—for example, capital or additional categories of
labor. We allow for the possibility of substitution between factors by
assuming that the set of tasks performed by low-skilled labor (hence-
forth, “L-tasks”) can be operated at different intensities, as can the set
of tasks that must be performed by high-skilled labor (henceforth, “H-
tasks”), and any others tasks that may be needed for production. That
is, when substitution is possible, a firm can achieve a given level of
output either by conducting the L-tasks repeatedly and the H-tasks
less often, or by performing the H-tasks more frequently and the L-
tasks less so. Our model does not require that such substitution be
technologically feasible. Indeed, the simplest case to consider is one in
which each task must be performed exactly once in order to generate
a unit of output.
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As in the traditional trade models, we assume that the two goods
differ in their “factor intensities.” Suppose, for example, that a country
imports textiles and exports financial services, and that textile produc-
tion is relatively intensive in its use of low-skilled labor compared to
high-skilled labor. Firms in each industry undertake a set of L-tasks
and a set of H-tasks to produce their output. Our assumption that
textiles are relatively labor-intensive means that, in this industry, the
ratio of the low-skilled labor employed to perform L-tasks to the high-
skilled labor employed to perform H-tasks exceeds the similar ratio of
employments used in producing financial services. 
For the time being, let us assume that it is only possible to offshore
tasks performed by low-skilled labor; all other tasks must be
performed in close proximity to a firm’s headquarters. In both the
import-competing industry and the export industry, the various L-
tasks differ in their suitability for offshoring. This may be because
some tasks are easy to codify or describe with rules-based logic (for
example, “sew this button two inches from the side and four inches
from the bottom”) and others are less so (for example, “check that the
quality of this item meets our standards”). Or it may be because some
services must be delivered personally (for example, “clean this room”),
while others can be performed at a distance with little loss in quality
(for example, “answer this customer service call”). For our purposes,
we simply need to recognize and incorporate the variation in the costs
of offshoring different tasks. 
We assign a number (or index) between 0 and 1 to each of the L-tasks.
Since these labels are arbitrary, we may choose them so that tasks with
lower indexes can more readily be performed offshore than those with
higher indexes. Suppose task i would require some amount of domestic
low-skilled labor if performed close to a firm’s headquarters. We assume
that the same task would require βt(i)>1 units of foreign labor per unit
of local labor if performed abroad. Here, t(i) is an increasing function of
i because of our ordering of the tasks. The parameter β reflects the
overall feasibility of offshoring at a point in time. We can represent
improvements in transportation and communication technology that
make the offshoring of L-tasks more economical as reductions in β. 74 Gene M. Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
Tasks can be offshored within or outside the boundaries of the firm.
For our purposes, it does not matter much whether the firm opens a
subsidiary in a foreign country and employs workers there to undertake
certain tasks within its corporate boundaries, or whether it contracts
with a foreign purveyor under an outsourcing arrangement. The recent
trade literature has examined which organizational form is preferable in
different countries and different industries,
11 but in either case, the
effects on production, wages, and prices will be roughly the same. For
the analytics of this paper, we will not distinguish between offshore
outsourcing and intrafirm dealings by multinational corporations.
Which tasks will a firm send offshore? The benefit of offshoring a
given task derives from the lower wages abroad. The cost derives from
instructing and monitoring workers at a distance or from impersonal
delivery of services. Clearly, the firm will offshore those tasks for
which the benefits exceed the costs. Let w and w* be the domestic
and foreign wage rates for low-skilled labor. Then, a firm will choose
to offshore those L-tasks (with low indexes i) for which βt(i)w*< w
and to keep in close proximity those tasks (with high indexesi) for
which βt(i)w*>w. We denote by I the index of the marginal task,
which is the one that entails a similar cost in either location. Then 
(1) w=βt(I)w*. 
Note that I also is the fraction of L-tasks performed offshore because
we have constructed the index of tasks to run from 0 to 1.
12 
Now, consider the cost c of producing one unit of some good. This
cost comprises the amount paid to domestic low-skilled labor for L-
tasks performed at home, the amount paid to foreign low-skilled
labor for L-tasks performed abroad, the amount paid to high-skilled
labor for performing H-tasks, and the amount paid to any other
factors that may be used in production. In symbols, 
(2)  c = waL(1–I )+   w*aLβT (I)+saH +… 
where aLis the amount of domestic low-skilled labor used by the indus-
try to perform a typical L-task, aH is the amount of high-skilled labor
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skilled labor. The factor intensities, aL and aH, may be fixed by the tech-
nical requirements of production, or they may reflect the firms’ optimal
choices in light of substitution opportunities and prevailing factor
prices. The first term on the right-hand side of (2) represents the
product of the wage and the amount of domestic low-skilled labor used
per unit of output, where the latter is the labor input per task times the
fraction of tasks 1–I that the firm chooses to undertake at home. The
second term on the right-hand side of (2) represents, analogously, the
wage payments to foreign unskilled workers. Here, βT (I) is the ratio
of foreign labor to domestic labor that is needed to perform all of the
tasks with indexes less than or equal to I.
13 This ratio exceeds one to an
extent that reflects the extra costs associated with remote performance
of this set of tasks. The third term in (2) is the amount paid to domes-
tic-skilled labor per unit of output, considering (for the time being)
that the tasks undertaken by these workers cannot be performed
offshore, and so on for any additional factors. 
Substituting (1) into (2), we find that 
(3)  c = wΩaL + saH +…
where Ω<1.
14 This way of writing the unit cost emphasizes that the
wage bill for low-skilled labor is a fraction of what it would be
without the possibility of offshoring, before we take into account any
changes in factor prices that result from offshoring and any substitu-
tion between factors that might take place. Notice that equation (3)
looks just like the cost equation of a firm that has no opportunity to
offshore but employs low-skilled workers whose productivity is
(inversely) measured by Ω. If such a firm were to experience an
improvement in the productivity of its low-skilled labor, this would
generate a direct cost savings for the firm in proportion to the
product of its labor use per unit of output aL and the domestic wage
w. Similarly, when offshoring becomes less costly (lower β), so that
Ω falls, this generates a cost savings for a firm that conducts some L-
tasks abroad of a similar magnitude. In this sense, improvements in
the feasibility of offshoring are economically equivalent to labor-
augmenting technological progress. 
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The consequences of a reduction in offshoring costs 
As we have discussed above, the revolution in information technol-
ogy makes it economical for firms to offshore more tasks than ever
before. We can examine the implications of this transformation in
economic geography using the analytical framework described in the
previous section. Recall that we used βt(i) to represent the ratio of the
foreign labor needed to perform task i in a given industry relative to
the domestic labor needed to perform the same task. The costs of
offshoring have been falling over time, thanks to the fax machine, e-
mail, mobile telephony, videoconferencing, and the like. We can
model these trends as a decline in β that shifts the schedule of
offshoring costs downward. 
Accounting for all the effects of a reduction in the cost of offshoring
requires a general equilibrium model of production and trade. We
have developed such a model in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006). As we have noted before, the model has two sectors: one that
produces an export good and another that can produce goods that
compete with imports. Both sectors are assumed to be perfectly
competitive, although our conclusions would be much the same in a
model with fixed markups of prices over unit costs. The model allows
for two, three, or many factors of production. 
We have not as yet discussed how the costs of offshoring L-tasks in
the import-competing industry compare to those for offshoring such
tasks in the export sector. It may be easier to perform remotely a given
fraction of the L-tasks used to produce textiles than the L-tasks used in
providing financial services. Or the opposite may be true. And
improvements in communications and transportation technologies
may reduce offshoring costs more dramatically in one industry than the
other. We know of no evidence that speaks to whether offshoring of L-
tasks is easier in import-competing industries or export industries.
15
Without any data to guide us, we focus first on the neutral case in
which offshoring possibilities are similar across industries; that is, the
same t(i) schedule applies to both sectors and the same cost parameter
β applies as well. Consideration of other possibilities will be discussed
in the “Offshoring that is concentrated in certain industries” section. 
 The Rise of Offshoring: It’s Not Wine for Cloth Anymore 77
A fall in the cost of offshoring L-tasks affects the domestic market
for unskilled labor via several channels. First, it reduces the cost of
performing the low-skill tasks, as we emphasized in the previous
section. Second, it creates an imbalance between labor demand and
labor supply at the initial factor prices, output levels, and techniques
of production because firms will have incentive to substitute foreign
labor for domestic labor in performing certain additional tasks. The
effects of this imbalance are analogous to those of an increase in the
domestic supply of low-skilled labor. Finally, it provides different
incentives for the two sectors to expand, which changes the composi-
tion of output at the initial prices. If the offshoring country is a large
one such as the United States, this would create imbalances in world
markets at the initial prices. So, the relative price of goods must
respond to preserve market-clearing. Such changes in relative prices
have further implications for factor rewards, as we know from tradi-
tional trade theory. 
In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), we show that the change
in the domestic wage of low-skilled labor resulting from a decline in
β can be decomposed into three components. Using a “hat” over a
variable to represent a percentage change, we can write 
(4) ˆ w = –  ˆ Ω − α1 ˆ p – α2 dI ––– 1 –I
where p is the relative price of the offshoring country’s export good in
terms of its import good, or its terms of trade. 
We call the first term on the right-hand side of (4) the productivity
effect. It has been overlooked in much of the previous academic liter-
ature and public discussion of offshoring.
16 All else equal, as a decline
in the cost of offshoring leads more L-tasks to be sourced abroad,
costs fall in proportion to low-skilled labor usage. The fall in Ω tends
to boost demand for low-skilled labor and, thus, push up their wages.
The second term on the right-hand side of (4) is a relative-price
effect. A change in the ease of offshoring often will alter a country’s
terms of trade. If the home country’s terms of trade improve (p rises),
this typically will exert downward pressure on the low-skill wage
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because countries that offshore L-tasks usually export goods that rely
more heavily on high-skilled labor than on low-skilled labor. The
final term is a labor-supply effect. The expanded offshoring of L-tasks
(dI > 0, where dI denotes the change in the set of tasks offshored) frees
up the domestic labor that otherwise would perform these tasks, and
so has effects analogous to an increase in the supply of this factor. 
Similarly, the effect of improved prospects for offshoring L-tasks on
the wages paid to high-skilled workers can be decomposed, to obtain 
(5) ˆ s = α3 ˆ p + α4  dI –––. 1 –I
Notice that there is no direct productivity effect. We see in (2) that a
change in offshoring of low-skilled tasks has no direct effect on the
firm’s wage bill for high-skilled workers. To the extent that a change
in offshoring improves the terms of trade, this will tend to benefit
high-skilled workers in a country that exports skill-intensive goods.
Also, the freeing up of domestic low-skilled labor that attends an
offshoring of additional L-tasks can have beneficial implications for
high-skilled workers. 
The decompositions in (4) and (5) help us to think systematically
about how improving communications technology and the resultant
increase in task trade affects domestic factor markets. In the remain-
der of this section, we examine the effects of improved prospects for
offshoring in various trading environments. In the next section, we
use (4) as the basis for assessing the recent history of wage movements
for blue-collar workers in the United States. 
Offshoring in a small Heckscher-Ohlin economy 
The most familiar framework for studying trade between more-
developed and less-developed economies is the Heckscher-Ohlin
model. The model features two industries and two factors of produc-
tion. Each factor is employed relatively intensively in one of the
industries. For example, the textile industry employs relatively more
low-skilled workers than high-skilled workers, whereas the opposite is
true in financial services. In this model, a country exports the good
that makes intensive use of its relatively abundant factor. 
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We can add offshoring to the model in the manner described above.
In each industry, production involves a set of low-skill tasks and a set of
high-skill tasks, with or without the possibility of substitution between
these sets of tasks. Low-skill tasks in each industry can be performed
offshore where wages are lower than they are at home. But some tasks
are quite costly to offshore, while others are less so. Firms in each indus-
try decide which tasks to offshore and which to keep at home. 
To help with intuition, we consider first a “small economy.” In the
parlance of international trade theory, a small economy is one where
decisions and outcomes do not affect world prices. The United States is
not a small economy, of course, but we can think of offshoring by, for
example, firms in Belgium. Belgium’s task trade is unlikely to affect
world prices of the goods it trades or wage rates in the developing world. 
Equations (4) and (5) help us derive the factor-price effects of
improvements in Belgium’s opportunities for offshoring (holding fixed,
for the moment, the trading environment in the rest of the world). By
assumption, there are no changes in world prices; so ˆ p = 0. Moreover,
the Heckscher-Ohlin model has the property that changes in factor
supplies do not affect factor prices, as long as both industries are active.
An increase in the supply of, say, low-skilled labor, leads to an expan-
sion of the labor-intensive sector and a contraction of the skill-intensive
sector, so that extra workers are absorbed without any fall in the
marginal product of low-skilled labor. This feature of the model implies
that α2 = α4 = 0; the “as if” increase in labor supply that attends an
expansion of offshoring has no effect on wages in this setting. It follows,
then, that  ˆ w = – ˆ Ω > 0 and ˆ s = 0. That is, domestic, low-skilled labor
captures all of the benefits from the technological improvements in
offshoring, while domestic high-skilled labor is left unaffected. 
The small Heckscher-Ohlin economy reveals the productivity effect
of offshoring in stark contrast. The initial impact of an improvement in
the possibilities for importing L-tasks is a reduction in the demand for
low-skilled labor, as tasks formerly performed by these workers are
moved offshore. But the international relocation of tasks generates cost
savings for both industries, the largest of which accrue to the sector that
relies most heavily on low-skilled labor. Thus, the labor-intensive
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industry has a greater incentive to expand and does so relative to the
skill-intensive industry. The expansion more than offsets the initial fall
in labor demand, so that the domestic, low-skilled workers are utilized
in the economy—and the additional foreign workers are accommo-
dated—at a higher marginal product than before. 
Offshoring in a large Heckscher-Ohlin economy 
In a large economy such as the United States, there is more to the
story. The response of relative outputs to improved opportunities for
offshoring will alter world relative prices. And an increase in task trade
will affect wages in the country where the offshored work is performed. 
In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), we examined a Heckscher-
Ohlin world economy with two large countries in which each country
exports the good that makes intensive use of its abundant factor. Wages
in the more-developed economy are uniformly higher than those in the
less-developed country due to an assumed productivity advantage that
applies in all industries.
17 At the outset, there is offshoring of L-tasks in
both industries. We consider again a uniform improvement in the tech-
nology for offshoring; that is, the costs of remote L-task performance
decline in both sectors. 
As before, there is a productivity effect that works to the benefit of
low-skilled labor in the country with technological superiority (for
example, the United States). Now, however, we also find a relative-price
effect. The relative world output of labor-intensive goods expands at
the initial relative prices, causing the terms of trade in the richer
country to improve. This movement in relative prices exerts upward
pressure on the wage of high-skilled labor in both countries and down-
ward pressure on the wages of their less-skilled counterparts. These
effects are familiar from the work of Stolper and Samuelson (1941).
Again, there is no labor-supply effect of the increased offshoring
because changes in factor supplies do not affect factor prices in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model when countries are incompletely specialized.
Thus, the rich country experiences an increase in the wages of skilled
workers and an improvement in its terms of trade.
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What happens to the wages of the low-skilled workers in the
advanced economy? The answer depends on the relative strengths of
the two offsetting influences. If demands for the goods are inelastic,
the relative-price movements in response to supply changes will be
large. And if the import-competing and export sectors are not very
different in their factor intensities, then the responses of wages to rela-
tive-price movements will be large. In such circumstances, the
relative-price effect will be large and may dominate the productivity
effect. But the opposite also is possible, in which case, an improvement
in the technology for trading tasks will generate a “win-win” situation
in the country with technological superiority; all workers there may
share in the gains from offshoring, regardless of their skill levels. In
particular, the workers who were performing the tasks that are being
offshored will benefit from this process. 
Labor-supply effect 
Leamer (2006) and others have drawn an analogy between increased
opportunities for offshoring (and the increased integration of poor
countries into the world economy more generally) and an expansion in
the world supply of low-skilled labor. There is an element of truth to this
argument, although we have seen that it captures only part of the story.
But we have not yet seen any implications of this expanding labor supply
for domestic wages. The explanation for this lies in a special property of
the Heckscher-Ohlin model with incomplete specialization; factor
growth can be accommodated by a change in the composition of output
in each country, without any impact on factor prices. 
In other trading environments, factor prices do respond to factor
supplies. So, there is one further effect of improvements in opportuni-
ties for the offshoring of L-tasks that bears discussing. The simplest
setting in which to see it is one in which the offshoring economy is
specialized in producing a single good.
19 
Consider a small country that produces a single good and takes the
world price of that good and the foreign wage as given. As the cost of
offshoring L-tasks falls, firms there move more tasks abroad. This raises
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productivity, but, at the same time, it increases the total amount of low-
skilled labor (foreign and domestic) that is combined with a fixed
supply of high-skilled labor. There are offsetting effects on the wage of
the country’s low-skilled labor. In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006), we show that the low-skill wage must fall if the initial volume
of offshoring is small, but, as task trade grows, the adverse effects on
low-skill wages may be reversed. The (positive) productivity effect is
more likely to dominate the (negative) labor-supply effect if the share
of low-skilled labor in total costs is large, the elasticity of substitution
between low- and high-skilled labor is large, and the costs of
offshoring rise sharply with the fraction of tasks that is sourced
abroad. Our calculations in the next section, which are meant to shed
some light on the relative size of the productivity and labor-supply
effects of task trade, suggest that the former effect may well dominate
the latter for American blue-collar workers. 
Offshoring that is concentrated in certain industries 
Until now, we have discussed the effects of offshoring when firms in
all sectors of the economy face similar costs of moving tasks abroad. This
seems to us the natural case to address because offshoring has become
widespread across many different manufacturing and service industries.
No doubt it is easier to offshore tasks in some sectors than others. But
we see no reason to suspect that the ease of offshoring low-skill tasks is
systematically related to the overall skill intensity of the industry.
But for those whose reading of the (scant) evidence is different from
ours, it is easy enough to adapt our framework to study offshoring that
occurs predominantly in certain industries. In the special case where
offshoring of L-tasks is heavily concentrated in labor-intensive indus-
tries such as textiles and apparel, reductions in the cost of offshoring
have effects similar to those of technological progress that are concen-
trated in such industries.
20 Alternatively, if industries that rely heavily
on input of highly skilled labor, such as pharmaceuticals and finance,
are the ones that can most readily move their L-tasks abroad, then
reductions in the costs of offshoring will generate wage responses like
those of technological progress in these industries. And we know from
Jones (1965), Leamer (1998), and others that technological progress
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in an industry tends to benefit the factors that are used most inten-
sively there. So, improvements in the ease of offshoring L-tasks in
labor-intensive manufacturing industries will tend to benefit low-
skilled workers even more than in the neutral case described above,
whereas high-skilled workers will benefit from improved possibilities
for offshoring L-tasks in skill-intensive industries. 
Offshoring tasks performed by skilled workers 
The offshoring of white-collar jobs has created even more media
frenzy than the migration of blue-collar jobs. Although the evidence
suggests that the offshoring of tasks requiring great skill has been
modest to date, there can be little doubt that the future holds more
of this. What will be the consequences for U.S. labor markets? 
The framework developed in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) can readily accommodate the offshoring of tasks that require
high-skilled labor. We can introduce a schedule analogous to that for
L-tasks that represents the extra foreign labor needed to perform a
given H-task. Skilled workers in China and India earn less than their
counterparts in the United States and Europe because the state of
technology there continues to lag that in the leading economies.
Firms in the advanced countries, thus, have an incentive to offshore
those H-tasks that can be performed remotely without significant
trade costs. 
Our analysis of trade in H-tasks is straightforward and should
hold few surprises at this point. In general, such offshoring gener-
ates a productivity effect, a relative-price effect, and a factor-supply
effect, much like the offshoring of L-tasks. But the incidence is
different. The productivity effect redounds to the benefit of the
more-educated domestic workers; for example, the American soft-
ware engineer who can design more programs because a substantial
part of the code is written in India. The relative-price effect works
against the high-skilled workers—as the skill-intensive sector
expands, the relative price of its output falls, which raises wages for
low-skilled workers, while reducing those for high-skilled workers.
And the additional opportunities for offshoring white-collar tasks
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further boost the wages of the less skilled and offset the productiv-
ity gains for the more-educated parts of the workforce. In sum, the
bottom tier of the American wage distribution should benefit from
further expansion in the offshoring of high-skill tasks, and the
middle and upper tiers may gain as well, if the productivity boost is
large enough. 
So far, we have focused attention on cases in which offshoring
costs fall for tasks performed by either low-skilled or high-skilled
labor. However, a distinct possibility is that the ease of offshoring is
independent of skill level (Blinder, 2006). In such circumstances, a
decrease in the cost of offshoring all tasks in the economy will gener-
ate a productivity effect for both factors. Overall, this fall in
offshoring costs will resemble a factor-neutral increase in productiv-
ity, without any effect on the relative price or relative factor supplies.
The result is a similar increase in the wages of all workers.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation 
Ideally, we would like to be able to isolate the productivity, relative-
price, and labor-supply effects that have resulted from the recent
growth in task trade by U.S. firms. However, considering the pitfalls
that exist in measuring the extent of such trade, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish the labor-market effects of increased
offshoring from other trends in the world economy. Accordingly, we
shall settle for a more modest approach. We shall ask whether recent
trends in the wages of low-skilled workers in the United States are
consistent with the existence of a positive productivity effect from
increased offshoring. We do so by identifying a residual component of
real wage movements for low-skilled workers after accounting for the
estimated effects of TFP growth and of terms-of-trade changes. In our
model, the residual component represents the combined effects of the
labor-supply expansion and productivity enhancement that result
from improved opportunities for offshoring. We find that the residual
has been almost uniformly positive over the period from 1998 to
2004, a finding that is consistent with the existence of a positive
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productivity effect from increased offshoring that has bolstered the
wages of low-skilled Americans. 
The lightest curve in Chart 5 shows the movement in hourly wages
for low-skilled blue-collar workers from 1997 through 2004. We
measure the wages of low-skilled, blue-collar workers as the compen-
sation of Level 1 blue-collar workers in the National Compensation
Survey.
21 As an alternative measure of the wages of American low-
skilled labor, we show in Chart 6 the time series for average hourly
wages among all blue-collar workers. The wage of low-skilled, blue-
collar workers has risen from $7.38 per hour in 1997 to $8.97 per
hour in 2004. The hourly wage of the average blue-collar worker has
risen from $12.36 to $15.46 during this period. The second-lightest
curve in each chart shows the pertinent real wage after adjusting for
inflation of the Consumer Price Index. Real wages of the least-skilled
and average blue-collar worker have risen modestly over the period. 
The curve in Chart 5 labeled “Wage 97 + TFP” shows the hourly
wages that low-skilled, blue-collar workers would have earned in each
year subsequent to 1997 had the path of wages followed the path of
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measured TFP growth in the United States after 1997.
22 The analo-
gous curve in Chart 6 has a similar interpretation for wages of the
average blue-collar worker. In adjusting for TFP growth in this way, we
make two implicit assumptions. First, we assume that technological
progress in the United States from 1997 to 2004 was “factor neutral,”
so that the productivity of low-skilled workers increased by the same
amount as the productivity of more-skilled workers and of other
factors of production. These circumstances would justify our use of
TFP as a productivity adjustment for low-skilled workers. In fact,
many labor economists have argued that recent technological progress
in the United States has been “skill-biased,” and not neutral. If so,
then our method underestimates the beneficial effects of offshoring,
as we shall discuss shortly. 
Second, we assume that the measured growth in TFP has not been
because of offshoring. Observe that we do not adjust wages using a
direct measure of labor productivity (such as output per hour), but
rather an average measure of the productivity of all factors of produc-
tion in the U.S. economy. This approach is suggested by our analysis,
which shows that the productivity gains from increased offshoring are
indistinguishable from (low-skilled) labor-augmenting technological
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progress. Therefore, if we were to adjust wages by an ideal measure of
the productivity of low-skilled labor, we would eliminate the very effect
that we are trying to identify in the data. By instead using TFP to adjust
wages, we take out the general trend in American productivity, while
leaving the impacts of any labor-biased technological change. To the
extent that offshoring has been responsible for part of the measured
increase in TFP, our approach will understate the productivity effect.
We believe, however, that this bias in our measurement is small because
the contribution of increased offshoring of low-skill tasks to TFP is the
product of the equivalent labor-augmenting technological progress and
the income share of low-skilled labor. The least-skilled, blue-collar
workers capture only a small share of total U.S. factor income. 
A further caveat to our approach concerns capital deepening. When
the capital-to-labor ratio rises, labor productivity will grow by more
than the measured increase in TFP. To the extent that the accumu-
lated capital is complementary to low-skilled labor, the capital
deepening may bolster low-skill wages in a way that resembles the
effect of offshoring that we are trying to isolate. There is some
evidence that capital deepening has contributed to overall labor
productivity and therefore, presumably, to average wages during the
period under consideration. However, as Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel
(2005) argue, more than three-quarters of the effect of capital deep-
ening on labor productivity can be traced to the accumulation of
information technology and software. Labor economists have shown
that computers complement high-skilled labor, but substitute for
low-skilled labor (see, for example, Krueger, 1993). Therefore, the
capital deepening that has occurred probably has contributed mostly
to high-skill wages and little if any to low-skill wages, and, thus, is
properly omitted from our analysis. 
The charts show that the real wages of low-skilled, blue-collar
workers and of the average blue-collar worker have not kept up with
overall productivity growth in the U.S. economy. One reason for this
might be the labor-market implications of “globalization” as reflected in
recent movements in the U.S. terms of trade. Next, we will attempt to
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As we have noted, part of the movement in terms of trade may have
been because of improved possibilities for offshoring. Indeed, the
Heckscher-Ohlin variant of our model of offshoring predicts that as
the cost of offshoring L-tasks falls, the relative world output of labor-
intensive goods should rise, thereby exerting downward pressure on
the relative price of these goods. However, the improved opportunities
for offshoring are hardly the only—or even the most important—
factor that has moved the U.S. terms of trade. For one thing,
petroleum prices have risen precipitously during the period under
consideration. But as these prices play no explicit role in our model,
we can avoid confounding the forces of globalization with those of oil
price hikes by choosing a measure of the terms of trade that excludes
these prices. Still, movements in the relative prices of goods and serv-
ices traded between the United States and the labor-rich economies in
Asia and Latin American have moved for reasons having little to do
with offshoring. As is well-known, China and India have experienced
dramatic growth in recent years as these countries have improved their
regulatory environments, removed impediments to investment and
entry, and more fully joined the world economy. Both trade liberaliza-
tion and productivity growth in these economies could account for an
expansion in the relative world supply of labor-intensive goods. Since
we cannot separate the part of the terms-of-trade movements because
of improved offshoring from that due to productivity growth and
trade liberalization in the developing countries, we shall simply lump
them together and estimate what combined effect they may have had
on U.S. low-skill wages. 
Our model highlights trade between advanced economies and devel-
oping economies as a source of wage movements. In an attempt to
capture this effect empirically, we use a measure of U.S. terms of trade
with the nonindustrialized countries. The best available measure is the
one shown in Chart 7. For the numerator, we use the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) price index for U.S. exports to all destinations because
indexes for exports to particular countries or regions are not available.
For the denominator, we use the BLS price index for U.S. imports of
manufactured products from nonindustrialized countries. The chart
shows a sharp improvement in the U.S. terms of trade vis-à-vis the
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nonindustrialized countries. From 1997 to 2004, the total improve-
ment was 10.8 percent, averaging 1.4 percent per year at an annual,
compounded rate. 
In order to estimate what this terms-of-trade improvement might
have meant for the wages of low-skilled American workers, we need
to know how domestic wages respond to 26 relative international
prices; that is, the coefficient α1 in equation (4). In the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, which we use as the basis for our calculation, 
α1 =    , 
where θLM is the cost share of low-skilled labor in the relatively labor-
intensive import-competing industry, and θLX is the cost share of
low-skilled labor in the relatively skill-intensive export industry. We
do not have ready access to low-skilled labor shares for the average
good imported from nonindustrialized countries or the average good
exported to such countries. Instead, we calculate the labor share in
value added, using data published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, for some representative industries.
23 Note that α1 is smaller,
and thus, the impact of terms-of-trade movements on wages is
smaller, and the assumed difference in factor intensities is larger. For
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our benchmark calculation, we choose two industries, one that
competes with imports from the less-developed countries and the
other that exports to these countries, that have quite different labor
shares. These are textile mills and textile product mills, where the
labor share in value added averages 0.76 over the period, and chem-
ical products, where the labor share in value added averages 0.44
over the period. To the extent that these differences in labor shares
exaggerate the factor intensity differential for goods that the United
States imports from nonindustrialized countries and exports to these
countries, our proxies will cause us to underestimate the beneficial
impact of offshoring on low-skill wages. 
In Charts 5 and 6, the darkest curve (labeled “Wage 97 + TFP +
SS,” where SS is an abbreviation for Stolper-Samuelson) subtracts
from “Wage 97 + TFP” the computed adverse impact of terms-of-
trade changes on the wages of those with low skills in our baseline
case. In other words, these darkest curves illustrate what wages for
the low-skilled, blue-collar worker and the average blue-collar
worker would have been had TFP and the U.S. terms of trade vis-à-
vis non-industrialized countries been the only factors affecting
wages. As is evident in Charts 5 and 6, the negative relative-price
effect almost cancels the positive effect of TFP on real wages, so these
two forces together imply that the low-skill wage should have been
approximately constant. The gap between the “Wage 97 + TFP +
SS” curve and the path of real wages is the part of the wage experi-
ence that cannot be explained by changes in TFP and changes in the
terms of trade. In our model, this residual reflects the labor-supply
effect and the productivity effect (but not the relative-price effect) of
increased offshoring by American firms. 
Notice that “Wage 97 + TFP + SS” lies below the real wage curve
of low-skilled, blue-collar workers in all years between 1997 and
2004, except 2001, and that it lies below the real wage curve for the
average blue-collar worker throughout the period. If we interpret the
residual as being the combined labor-supply effect and productivity
effect of offshoring, then the combined effect has been positive,
suggesting a beneficial productivity effect that has more than offset
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any adverse labor-supply effect. In the first row of Table 1, we indi-
cate that on average for the period from 1998 through 2004, the
residual has been 0.25 percent per year for low-skilled, blue-collar
workers and 0.65 percent for the average blue-collar worker. The last
column shows the result of applying the same methods to the wages
of low-skilled, white-collar workers, which yields an average residual
of 0.06 percent per year.
The remainder of Table 1 shows the average residuals that result
when alternative measures of the Stolper-Samuelson coefficient are
used. In the second row, we measure α1 using for θLM the average
labor share in value added for all manufacturing industries (as a
proxy for the labor share in import-competing industries) and for
θLX the average labor share in finance, insurance, and real estate,
which is an exported service for the United States. These labor-share
differentials are smaller than for textiles and chemicals, so the esti-
mated residuals are larger. Finally, the third row uses the labor shares
in all goods as a proxy for the share in import-competing sectors, and
the labor shares in all services as a proxy for the share in all export
sectors. These values for θLM and θLX imply even larger, positive
residuals. We conclude that our methods conservatively indicate that
American workers are earning more in recent years than can be
explained based on realized TFP gains and realized relative-price
effects since 1997. 
Industries/Wages Low-Skilled Average Low-Skilled
Blue-Collar Blue-Collar White-Collar
Imports = Textile Mills and  0.25%  0.65%  0.06%
Textile Product Mills
Exports = Chemical Products
Imports = Manufacturing 0.38%  0.78%  0.19%
Exports = Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Imports = Goods 5.49%  5.90%  5.30%
Exports = Services
Table 1
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Although the real wage growth for low-skilled workers in the United
States has been far from exceptional (and, some might say, “far from
acceptable”), the experience apparently has not been as bad as one
might have expected based on the sharp improvement in U.S. terms
of trade vis-à-vis the nonindustrialized countries. Our finding is
consistent with the hypothesis that increased offshoring has been a
countervailing force that has supported American wages. But are there
other factors that have been omitted from our analysis that could have
contributed to the residual? 
Three omitted factors come to mind. First, we have assumed in our
calculations that recent technological progress in the United States has
been neutral with respect to productivity growth for different factors
of production. In fact, many labor economists believe that recent tech-
nological progress has been biased in favor of high-skilled labor.
24 By
using TFP growth to adjust for the productivity gains of blue-collar
workers, instead of the presumably smaller productivity gains that
have been reaped by those with lesser skills, we have overstated the
predicted real wages based on productivity and relative-price effects,
and, therefore, understated the size of the residual. Thus, incorporat-
ing the bias in technological progress presumably would make our
estimated effects of offshoring larger. 
Second, the relative supply of skilled workers has been growing in
the United States for some time. Between 1997 and 2004, the ratio of
the United States labor force with some college education or more and
the labor force with high school education or less increased by 16.1
percent from 1.28 to 1.49, according to the Current Population Survey.
Much like an inflow of foreign workers, an expansion in the relative
supply of skilled workers conceivably can be accommodated without
any change in wages, if the skill-intensive sectors can expand to absorb
these workers without any reduction in their marginal product.
Indeed, the Heckscher-Ohlin model would predict that a change in
the relative factor supply has no effect on factor prices, since workers
can be absorbed via changes in the relative sizes of labor-intensive and
skill-intensive industries.
25 But if factor supplies do affect American
wages, then the growth in the relative supply of skilled labor may be
one factor besides the productivity effect of offshoring that has
buffeted the wages of the lesser-skilled workers. However, it would be
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surprising if this were the main factor affecting wages because an
increase in the relative supply of skilled workers should, if anything,
reduce the relative wages of those with ample skills, whereas the skill
premium has been rising in the United States over time. 
Third, we have neglected the effects of illegal immigration of low-
skilled workers. The available estimates indicate that in the last
decade, the growth in the unauthorized population in the United
States has averaged around half a million people per year (Passel,
2006, and Hanson, 2006). If we include illegal immigrants in the
calculation, the increase in the ratio of high- and low-skilled workers
is only 8.9 percent instead of 16.1 percent as we calculated above.
However, the net effect is still an increase in the supply of skills, and
so the arguments in the previous paragraph apply. 
To summarize, our simple decomposition of the recent wage expe-
rience suggests that the real wages of American low-skilled workers
were higher in 2004 than one would have expected based on the
growth in TFP and the improvements in the terms of trade that took
place after 1997. This positive residual likely would be even larger
than what we measured, had we been able to take into account the
skill bias in technological progress during the period. The positive
residual is consistent with there having been a positive productivity
effect from offshoring that more than offset any negative labor-supply
effect. However, even if the combined productivity effect and labor-
supply effect of offshoring has been positive, we cannot infer that the
total effect of offshoring has worked to the benefit of low-skilled
workers without incorporating also the relative-price effect. Our
calculations suggest that the rise in U.S. terms of trade vis-à-vis the
nonindustrialized countries has depressed low-skill wages to an extent
that exceeds the positive residual. So, if all of this price movement has
been due to improved opportunities for offshoring, the total effect of
offshoring has been negative. We believe, however, that part of the
U.S. terms-of-trade experience can be traced to other causes, such as
productivity gains that have occurred in the nonindustrialized coun-
tries and the further integration of these countries into the world
economy. We conclude that the data leave room for a positive effect
of offshoring on wages, consistent with the arguments in this paper. 
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Conclusion 
The nature of production has changed dramatically since the time
that David Ricardo proposed the basic concepts that underlie our
understanding of international trade. In the past, countries produced
mostly complete products that they consumed and traded with other
nations. Producers took advantage of the productivity gains that derive
from worker specialization by dividing the production process into a
variety of tasks. But these tasks had to be performed in close proximity
because of the large transportation and communication costs that
prevailed at the time. Today, drastic reductions in these costs have facil-
itated direct trade in tasks, which has generated a global production
process in a wide spectrum of industries. Now, producers and
consumers can capture the traditional benefits that derive from worker
specialization plus additional gains that are generated when tasks are
located where they can be performed most cheaply. We have argued
that to understand the consequences of this new way of organizing
production we need to move away from the traditional approaches to
trade in which only goods can be exchanged internationally, and move
toward a new paradigm in which task trade takes center stage. 
Within this new paradigm, we have studied the effect that task
trade—or offshoring—has on factor prices. Our analysis leads to a
very clear, and perhaps surprising, conclusion. If some tasks can be
more easily traded than others, the offshoring of tasks produced with
a particular factor is equivalent to technological progress that
augments the productivity of that factor. For example, the effect on
low-skill wages of improved opportunities for offshoring low-skill
tasks is similar to the effect on these wages of improvements in the
productivity of low-skilled workers. No reasonable economist,
commentator, or policymaker has ever raised her voice against
improvements in labor productivity. However, we do find many vocal
critics of offshoring. Hopefully, our simple paper will serve to high-
light this inconsistency. 
To further analyze the implications of increased offshoring for factor
prices, we decomposed the effect of offshoring on low-skill wages into
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three component parts: a productivity effect, a relative-price effect,
and a labor-supply effect. Many critics of offshoring have focused
exclusively on the last two of these components and have surmised
that offshoring of low-skill tasks surely must reduce low-skill wages or,
in the presence of labor-market frictions, increase unemployment.
Our analysis indicates that this reasoning is, at best, incomplete. The
evidence for the United States for the period from 1997 to 2004
suggests that the combined productivity and labor-supply effect on
low-skill wages has been positive and responsible for raising these
wages by about a quarter of a percent per year. It is even possible that
the overall effect of offshoring on low-skill wages has been positive
during this period, if the part of the terms-of-trade movement that has
been caused by offshoring has not been too large. Our calculations
admittedly are crude and so must be taken with a grain of salt until a
more thorough empirical study can be performed.
Authors’ note: The authors are grateful to David Autor, Alan Blinder, Jean B. Grossman,
Frank Levy, and John B. Taylor for comments and discussion, to Gary DeTurck for research
assistance, and to David Autor for graciously providing the data to update Chart 4. They
thank the National Science Foundation (grant nos. SES 0211748, SES 0451712 and SES
0453125) for financial support. 
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Endnotes
1We prefer the term “offshoring” to the more popular “outsourcing” because the
latter suggests that tasks formerly performed in-house are now being purchased at
arms-length, whereas the former implies that tasks formerly undertaken in one
country are now being performed abroad. In other words, offshoring includes not
only foreign sourcing from unrelated suppliers, but also the migration abroad of
some of the activities conducted by a multinational firm.
2See Bhagwati and others (2004), Samuelson (2004), Dobbs (2004), Friedman
(2005), Leamer (2006), Mankiw and Swagel (2005), and Blinder (2006), among
many others.
3Levy and Goelman (2005) apply this framework to analyze the future prospects
for offshoring in radiology. They argue that radiologists’ work requires pattern
recognition that defies characterization by rules. Accordingly, they foresee little
scope for the offshoring of radiology jobs.
4For more on this point, see National Research Council (2006).
5The OECD refers to this as the “proportionality assumption”; see its documenta-
tion at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/43/2673344.pdf. Hummels and others (2001)
make the same assumption in their measures of “vertical specialization”; see also the
discussion of this point in National Research Council (2006).
6In constructing Chart 1, we have used unpublished data for 1995 to 2000 provided
to us by Norihiko Yamano at the OECD, to whom we express our gratitude.
7A report by the  U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004, discusses this
and other shortcomings of the available U.S. data on service trade for assessing the
extent of task offshoring by U.S. firms.
8The published article by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) includes data for the
years 1960 through 1998. We are grateful to David Autor for providing us with the
data for the more recent period up to 2002.
9The authors’ data do not allow them to identify changes in the tasks required for
a particular occupation, but only changes in the aggregate task requirements that
result from changes in the industry and occupational composition of the workforce.
Their measures of task allocations are not constrained to sum to 100 percent
because the input of each type of task is measured relative to the distribution in
1960. So, the sum of the routine and nonroutine task measures for a given year has
no particular meaning.The Rise of Offshoring: It’s Not Wine for Cloth Anymore 97
10Note that we are assuming complementarity in production between the various
L-tasks (and between the various H-tasks). In fact, we assume there is no substitution
between L-tasks (or between H-tasks), so that all such tasks must be performed the
same number of times. This assumption can be relaxed. As long as lower costs of
producing some L-tasks (H-tasks) lead to increases in the quantity produced of other
L-tasks (H-tasks), the main qualitative implications of our model remain the same.
11See, for example, Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004), and Grossman
and Helpman (2004).
12Note that we are implicitly assuming that each L-task (H-task) is performed the
same number of times. This is without loss of generality because we can divide any
task that is repeated multiple times into multiple tasks denoted by different indexes.
As long as the resulting tasks have (slightly) different trade costs, the function t(i)
is increasing.
13Technically, T(I) = ∫ t (i)di.
14It is easy to see that
Ω = 1–I +         .
Since the least-cost tasks are offshored first, the excess labor requirement for the
marginal task, t (I ), exceeds the average excess foreign labor requirement, T(I)/I,
so T(I)/t(I )< I.
15Levy and Murnane (2004) suggest that more tasks using low-skilled labor can be
offshored economically than tasks requiring high-skilled labor, although some of both
can be performed remotely. But this is a different matter than the question of which
industry can more efficiently offshore its low-skill tasks. We will discuss the more
recent trends toward offshoring of white-collar jobs (H-Tasks) in the “Offshoring
tasks performed by skilled workers” section.
16Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) find a related effect as a result of the “fragmen-
tation” of the production process into two discrete parts. They consider the effects
of technological change that make it possible to perform these component parts of
the process in a different country. They find that importing a component in a given
industry that formerly had to be produced at home is like technological progress in
that industry. In contrast, our results show that with the more flexible trade in tasks,
offshoring of the tasks produced with a given factor is equivalent to factor augment-
ing technological change in all industries.
17Technically, we have assumed that the skilled-labor-abundant country has a
Hicks-neutral productivity advantage of the same magnitude in both sectors.
18It is interesting to ponder this result in the light of concerns expressed by Samuelson
(2004) about the possible effects of offshoring on U.S. aggregate welfare. Samuelson
noted that the United States might suffer from improved opportunities for offshoring if




098 Gene M. Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
the U.S. terms of trade, but will argue shortly that the opposite is true of increased
offshoring of high-skilled tasks. In this case, aggregate welfare may rise, notwithstand-
ing the deterioration of the terms of trade, if the productivity gain from offshoring is
large enough.
19More generally, factor prices will respond to factor supplies whenever the
number of a country’s factors of production exceeds the number of tradable goods
that it produces.
20Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) make this point forcefully in their discussion of
the fragmentation of production in one industry into two component parts.
21The National Compensation Survey assigns levels to different types of jobs depend-
ing on their knowledge, supervision received, the type of guidelines available,
complexity, scope, contacts required, physical demands, and work environment. Level
1 workers do the simplest tasks according to this classification.
22For TFP, we use the BLS calculation of Multifactor Productivity for Private
Nonfarm Businesses.
23Note that although we have thus far grouped tasks into those performed by low-
skilled labor and those performed by high-skilled labor, we could instead group
tasks into those performed by labor and those performed by other factors. Then,
our use of labor shares for calculating the Stolper-Samuelson coefficients would be
justified, although we would still need to calculate these shares for the representa-
tive exported and imported goods.
24See Katz and Murphy (1992); Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); Acemoglu
(2002); and Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), as well as the survey in Hornstein,
Krusell, and Violante (2005).
25The evidence seems to suggest that changes in the relative factor supply have no
substantial impact on wages, as Card (1990, 2005), Hunt (1992), and Friedberg
(2001), among others, have argued.
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